

MESSAGE FORM  
TOTAL COPIES:

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY

1		6
2		7
3		8
4		9
5		10

ORIG: [REDACTED] 25X1A  
UNIT: DD/OCI  
EXT: 7424  
DATE: 8 March 1968

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY 30 PER #  
CONF: 004

☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO \_\_\_\_\_ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

INFO:

FILE

VR

SAO, IRS, HR/OPS, DDI

DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADSP, CSRF, CSDO [REDACTED]

SAVAZ

(elite)

FEP

(classification)

(date and time filed)

(reference number)

SECRET

PRIORITY

TO STATE, DIA, SACS, DIRNSA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

CITE CIA

81153

25X1A

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO CAS SAIGON

QUOTE THIS IS A JOINT CAS STATE DEFENSE NSA MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY

AT OOB 9 MARCH TO AMBASSADOR, COMUSMACV [REDACTED]

25X1A

UNQUOTE (Sig Center copy from attached)

END OF MESSAGE

25X1A

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

R. J. SMITH, DDI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

SECRET

1. PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD HAS REQUESTED DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERTAKE AN APPRAISAL OF INTELLIGENCE WARNING PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE TASK TO BE COMPLETED BY 10 APRIL, WITH AN INTERIM REPORT ON 1 APRIL. THE DCI HAS CONVENED A WORKING GROUP OF USIB, PLUS REPRESENTATION FROM THE JOINT STAFF, TO MAKE THIS APPRAISAL AND PREPARE A REPORT. MUCH OF THE BASIC WORK, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE TO BE DONE IN <sup>and</sup> BY THE FIELD.

2. PFIAB HAS ASKED THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:

a. WHAT INFORMATION REACHED J-2, MACV, IN THE PERIOD JANUARY 15-30 INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES? WHAT CAN BE SAID AS TO THE ORIGIN, THE QUANTITY, THE ACCURACY AND THE TIMELINESS OF THIS INFORMATION?

b. IN HOW MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND TOWNS DID THE RESPONSIBLE FIELD COMMANDERS RECEIVE WARNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVOID BEING

SECRET

SURPRISED? PLEASE SHOW ON A MAP WHERE THESE ATTACKS OCCURRED WHICH WERE THUS FRUSTRATED.

c. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE VIETNAMESE CIVIL POPULATION GIVE INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACKS? (IT HAS BEEN SAID ON TELEVISION THAT THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE REPORT FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES ALERTING GVN/ US FORCES TO THE IMPENDING ATTACKS.) (WORKING GROUP ADDS: WHAT INFORMATION HAD VN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ACQUIRED WHICH WARNED OF THE IMPENDING ATTACKS?)

d. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THERE A FREE AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GVN AND US AGENCIES? (WORKING GROUP ADDS: AMONG THE SEVERAL US AGENCIES, AND AMONG THE SVN AGENCIES THEMSELVES?)

e. HAVE THE ENEMY UNITS WHICH ENGAGED IN THE ATTACKS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED? IF SO, WHAT CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THESE IDENTIFICATIONS? (THE BOARD RECOGNIZES THAT THE QUESTION IS MORE PROPERLY PART OF QUESTION a).

f. WHAT SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATED INFORMATION BEARING ON THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALS IN THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 15-30?

SECRET

(1) GENERAL WESTMORELAND, (2) JCS, (3) SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, (4) DCI, (5) THE PRESIDENT.  
(WORKING GROUP ADDS: AMBASSADOR BUNKER)

g. INsofar AS IT CAN BE RECONSTRUCTED, WHAT PICTURE DID THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OF THE SITUATION BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES?

3. YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE BULK OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED IN VIETNAM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL AGENCIES IN SAIGON ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE IMPACT ON YOUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, WE PROPOSE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM TO ASSIST IN COLLECTING AND REVIEWING RELEVANT INFORMATION. SUBJECT TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS, PROPOSE ABOUT THREE DAYS OF SAIGON CONSULTATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AND TWO OR THREE DAYS AT SELECTED FIELD LOCATIONS WITH A ONE-DAY WRAP-UP IN SAIGON.

A. MACV.

1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO BOARD'S QUESTIONS A THROUGH E, FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

SECRET

SECRET

2. PROVIDE MACV'S EVALUATION OF THIS MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON MACV'S PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
4. PREPARE A RESPONSE TO QUESTION F (1).
5. ARRANGE A FIELD ITINERARY TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SELECTED HEADQUARTERS AT CORPS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL, INCLUDING

25X1A

25X1A

B.

25X1A

1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL COLLECTED THROUGH CHANNELS DURING PERIOD 15-20 JANUARY WHICH CONTAINED INDICATIONS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.
2. PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON THIS MATERIAL, AND ON EVALUATION OF IT, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

SECRET

1. PROVIDE OFFICE SPACE AND CLERICAL  
SUPPORT.

C. EMBASSY SAIGON

PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON ITS STATE OF  
WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND ON  
ITS RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.

D. [REDACTED]

25X1A

1. PROVIDE ANY WARNING INFORMATION  
IT RECEIVED DURING 15-30 JANUARY.
2. PROVIDE BRIEFING ON THIS MATERIAL.
3. PROVIDE BRIEFING ON ITS PROCEDURES  
FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF  
INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

4. THE BOARD OF U.S. THAT STUDY BE CONCENTRATED  
ON THE 15-30 JANUARY PERIOD, BUT SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION  
RECEIVED PRIOR TO 15 JANUARY SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

5. TEAM COMPOSITION TO FOLLOW SEPARATE MESSAGE.

SECRET

ORIG: [REDACTED]  
 UNIT: DD/OCI  
 EXT: 7424  
 DATE: 8 March 1968 25X1A

SECRET

ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
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5	10

CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

BY: 30 PER: #

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO \_\_\_\_\_ BRANCH ☐ FILE  
☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

CONF: OC 4 ☐ RID COPY

INFO: FILE VR DCI, DDP, ADDP, D/DCI, CSRF

CSO SAH2 FEP, IRS, NA/OPS, SDO, DDI, [REDACTED] (elite)  
 (classification) (date and time filed) (reference number)

SECRET

25X1A

CITE DIRECTOR

TO PRIORITY  
 SAIGON

81147

25X1A

FOR COS

THIS IS A JOINT CAS STATE DEFENSE NSA MESSAGE FOR DELIVERY AT OOB 9 MARCH  
 25X1A  
 TO AMBASSADOR, COMUSMACV [REDACTED]

1. PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD HAS REQUESTED  
 DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERTAKE AN APPRAISAL OF INTELLIGENCE  
 WARNING PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE TASK TO BE COMPLETED BY 10 APRIL, WITH  
 AN INTERIM REPORT ON 1 APRIL. THE DCI HAS CONVENED A WORKING GROUP OF  
 USIB, PLUS REPRESENTATION FROM THE JOINT STAFF, TO MAKE THIS APPRAISAL AND  
 PREPARE A REPORT. MUCH OF THE BASIC WORK, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE TO BE DONE  
 IN AND BY THE FIELD.

2. PFIAB HAS ASKED THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS:

A. WHAT INFORMATION REACHED J-2, MACV, IN THE PERIOD JANUARY  
 15-30 INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES? WHAT CAN  
 BE SAID AS TO THE ORIGIN, THE QUANTITY, THE ACCURACY AND THE TIMELINESS  
 OF THIS INFORMATION?

(cont'd)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
 OFFICER

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ABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION

☐ INDEX

☐ DESTROY

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BRANCH

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RID COPY

INFO:

FILE , VR ,

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(date and time filed)

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SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

to (Page 2)

b. IN HOW MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND TOWNS DID THE RESPONSIBLE FIELD COMMANDERS RECEIVE WARNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVOID BEING SURPRISED? PLEASE SHOW ON A MAP WHERE THESE ATTACKS OCCURRED WHICH WERE THUS FRUSTRATED.

c. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE VIETNAMESE CIVIL POPULATION GIVE INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACKS? (IT HAS BEEN SAID ON TELEVISION THAT THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE REPORT FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES ALERTING GVN/US FORCES TO THE IMPENDING ATTACKS.) (WORKING GROUP ADDS: WHAT INFORMATION HAD VN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY ACQUIRED WHICH WARNED OF THE IMPENDING ATTACKS?)

d. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THERE A ~~FREE~~ FREE AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GVN AND US AGENCIES? (WORKING GROUP ADDS: AMONG THE SEVERAL US AGENCIES, AND AMONG THE SVN AGENCIES THEMSELVES?)

e. HAVE THE ENEMY UNITS WHICH ENGAGED IN THE ATTACKS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED? IF SO, WHAT CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THESE IDENTIFICATIONS? (THE BOARD RECOGNIZES THAT THE QUESTION IS MORE PROPERLY PART OF QUESTION A).

(cont'd)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER



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BY _____ PER _____ # _____		<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEX <input type="checkbox"/> FILE IN CS FILE NO.	
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		FILE _____, VR _____	
(classification)		(date and time filed)	
S E C R E T		(elite) (reference number)	

CITE DIRECTOR

TO (page 3)

f. WHAT SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATED INFORMATION BEARING ON THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALS IN THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 15-30? (1) GENERAL WESTMORELAND, (2) JCS, (3) SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, (4) DCI, (5) THE PRESIDENT. (WORKING GROUP ADDS: AMBASSADOR BUNKER)

g. INSOFAR AS IT CAN BE RECONSTRUCTED, WHAT PICTURE DID THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OF THE SITUATION BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES?

3. YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE BULK OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED IN VIETNAM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL AGENCIES IN SAIGON ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE IMPACT ON YOUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, WE PROPOSE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM TO ASSIST IN COLLECTING AND REVIEWING ~~KEY~~ RELEVANT INFORMATION. SUBJECT TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS, PROPOSE ABOUT THREE DAYS OF SAIGON CONSULTATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AND TWO OR THREE DAYS AT SELECTED FIELD LOCATIONS WITH A ONE-DAY WRAP-UP IN SAIGON.

(cont'd)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

GROUP 1  
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declassificationAUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

MESSAGE FORM		TOTAL COPIES:		ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
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UNIT:				2	7
EXT:				3	8
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				5	10

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BY _____ PER _____ # _____	<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEX	<input type="checkbox"/> FILE IN CS FILE NO.			
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		FILE _____, VR _____			

(classification) (date and time filed) (elite) (reference number)

SECRET

CITE DIRECTOR

TO (Page 4)

7 81147

A. MACV.

1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO BOARD'S QUESTIONS A THROUGH E, FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE RETURN TO WASHINGTON.
2. PROVIDE MACV'S EVALUATION OF THIS MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON MACV'S PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
4. PREPARE A RESPONSE TO QUESTION F (1).
5. ARRANGE A FIELD ITINERARY TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SELECTED HEADQUARTERS AT CORPS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL, INCLUDING

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

B.

1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL COLLECTED THROUGH CHANNELS DURING PERIOD 15-30 JANUARY WHICH CONTAINED INDICATIONS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.
2. PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON THIS MATERIAL, AND ON EVALUATION OF IT, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.

25X1A

25X1A

(CONT'D)

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AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

COPY NO.

MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES:		ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS - SEEN BY	
SECRET		1	6
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BY _____ PER _____ # _____	<input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEX <input type="checkbox"/> FILE IN CS FILE NO.		
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		FILE	VR
(classification)	(date and time filed)	(elite)	(pic)
		(reference number)	

~~SECRET~~

CITE DIRECTOR

to (Page 5)

25X1A

7 81147 7

3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON [REDACTED] PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND  
 EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

4. PROVIDE OFFICE SPACE AND CLERICAL SUPPORT.

C. EMBASSY SAIGON

PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON ITS STATE OF WARNING OF THE TET  
 OFFENSIVE AND ON ITS RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.

25X1A

D. [REDACTED]

1. PROVIDE ANY WARNING INFORMATION IT RECEIVED DURING 15-30  
 JANUARY.

2. PROVIDE BRIEFING ON THIS MATERIAL

3. PROVIDE BRIEFING ON ITS PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND  
 EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

4. THE BOARD REQUESTS THAT STUDY BE CONCENTRATED ON THE 15-30  
 JANUARY PERIOD, BUT SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION RECEIVED PRIOR TO 15 JAN  
 SHOULD BE INCLUDED.

5. TEAM COMPOSITION TO FOLLOW SEPARATE MESSAGE.

END OF MESSAGE

(See attached page for releasing and coordination)

XXXX

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

GROUP 1  
 Excluded from automatic  
 downgrading and  
 declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

ORIG:  
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BY PER #

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☐ RID COPY

☐ INDEX ☐ DESTROY ☐ RETURN TO ☐ BRANCH ☐ FILE RID

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(classification)

(date and time filed)

(elite)  
(reference number)

(place)

CITE DIRECTOR

TO

(Page 6)

781147

25X1A

State Fred Greene INR/REA  
JCS M/Gen W.E.DePuy SACSA  
DIA  
NSA  
SAVA

25X1A

25X1A

(all by phone)



R. J. SMITH, DDI  
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

AUTHENTICATING  
OFFICER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8 March 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: CIA 25X1A  
Attention: [REDACTED]

FROM: [REDACTED] 25X1A

1. Draft Message looks fine with following modifications:
  - a. Heading - make it a "Joint State - Defense - CIA - NSA message".
  - b. Page 5, para 4.d. - [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~SECRET~~

COMMANDERS RECEIVE WARNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE  
SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVOID BEING  
SURPRISED? PLEASE SHOW ON A MAP WHERE THESE  
ATTACKS OCCURRED WHICH WERE THUS FRUSTRATED.

...c. TO WHAT EXTENT DID THE VIETNAMESE CIVIL POPULATION GIVE INFORMATION TO THE AUTHORITIES BEFORE AND DURING THE ATTACKS? (IT HAS BEEN SAID ON TELEVISION THAT THERE WAS NOT A SINGLE REPORT FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES ALERTING GVN US FORCES TO THE IMPENDING ATTACKS.)

SINGLE REPORT FROM CIVILIAN SOURCES ALERTING GVN/  
US FORCES TO THE IMPENDING ATTACKS.) <sup>which information had</sup>  
<sup>VN intelligence and security agencies acquired which warned of the</sup>  
~~impending attack~~ TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THERE A FREE AND

RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GVN AND US AGENCIES? *among the several US agencies, and among the SVN agencies themselves.*

THEY HAVE THE ENEMY UNITS WHICH ENGAGED  
IN THE ATTACKS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED? IF SO, WHAT  
CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THESE IDENTIFICA-  
TIONS? (THE BOARD RECOGNIZES THAT THE QUESTION IS  
MORE PROPERLY PART OF QUESTION a).

1. WHAT SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATED INFORMATION BEARING ON THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES REACHED THE FOLLOWING OFFICIALS IN THE PERIOD OF JANUARY 15-30?

(1) *Ambassador Bunker* GENERAL WESTMORELAND, (2) JCS, (3) SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, (4) DCI, (5) THE PRESIDENT.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

D R A F T

JOINT STATE-DEFENSE - ~~NSA~~ CIA MESSAGE

TO: SAIGON

*Info CINCPAC Honolulu*

1. PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD HAS REQUESTED DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE TO UNDERTAKE AN APPRAISAL OF INTELLIGENCE WARNING PRIOR TO THE TET OFFENSIVE, TASK TO BE COMPLETED BY 10 APRIL, WITH AN INTERIM REPORT ON 1 APRIL. THE DCI HAS CONVENED A WORKING GROUP OF USIB, PLUS REPRESENTATION FROM THE JOINT STAFF, TO MAKE THIS APPRAISAL AND PREPARE A REPORT. MUCH OF THE BASIC WORK, HOWEVER, WILL HAVE TO BE DONE IN AND BY THE FIELD.

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a. WHAT INFORMATION REACHED J-2, MACV, IN THE PERIOD JANUARY 15-30 INDICATING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES? WHAT CAN BE SAID AS TO THE ORIGIN, THE QUANTITY, THE ACCURACY AND THE TIMELINESS OF THIS INFORMATION?

b. IN HOW MANY CASES OF ATTACKS ON THE CITIES AND TOWNS DID THE RESPONSIBLE FIELD

SECRET

COMMANDERS RECEIVE WARNING THROUGH INTELLIGENCE SOURCES IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO AVOID BEING SURPRISED? PLEASE SHOW ON A MAP WHERE THESE ATTACKS OCCURRED WHICH WERE THUS FRUSTRATED.

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d. TO WHAT EXTENT WAS THERE A FREE AND RAPID EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION BETWEEN GVN AND US AGENCIES? *Insert*

e. HAVE THE ENEMY UNITS WHICH ENGAGED IN THE ATTACKS NOW BEEN IDENTIFIED? IF SO, WHAT CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN FROM THESE IDENTIFICATIONS? (THE BOARD RECOGNIZES THAT THE QUESTION IS MORE PROPERLY PART OF QUESTION a).

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*Insert*



SECRET

G. INSOFAR AS IT CAN BE RECONSTRUCTED, WHAT PICTURE DID THESE OFFICIALS HAVE OF THE SITUATION BASED UPON INTELLIGENCE RECEIVED JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK ON THE CITIES?

3. YOU WILL RECOGNIZE THAT THE BULK OF THE INFORMATION REQUIRED CAN ONLY BE OBTAINED IN VIETNAM. WE RECOGNIZE THAT ALL AGENCIES IN SAIGON ARE HEAVILY COMMITTED TO CURRENT AND FUTURE OPERATIONS. IN ORDER TO REDUCE TO THE MINIMUM THE IMPACT ON YOUR DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, WE PROPOSE TO SEND A SMALL TEAM TO ASSIST IN COLLECTING AND REVIEWING RELEVANT INFORMATION. SUBJECT TO MISSION SUGGESTIONS, PROPOSE ABOUT THREE DAYS OF SAIGON CONSULTATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AND TWO OR THREE DAYS AT SELECTED FIELD LOCATIONS WITH A ONE-DAY WRAP-UP IN SAIGON.

4. IN PREPARATION FOR THE ARRIVAL OF THE TEAM, REQUEST MATERIALS BE ASSEMBLED, AS TIME PERMITS, AS FOLLOWS:

A. MACV.

1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO BOARD'S QUESTIONS A THROUGH E, FOR EXAMINATION AND POSSIBLE RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

-3-

SECRET

SECRET

2. PROVIDE MACV'S EVALUATION OF THIS MATERIAL, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON MACV'S PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
4. PREPARE A RESPONSE TO QUESTION F (1).
5. ARRANGE A FIELD ITINERARY TO INCLUDE VISITS TO SELECTED HEADQUARTERS AT CORPS/FIELD FORCE LEVEL, INCLUDING

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

B.

25X1A

1. ASSEMBLE MATERIAL COLLECTED THROUGH CHANNELS DURING PERIOD 15-30 JANUARY WHICH CONTAINED INDICATIONS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE, AND MATERIAL IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.

25X1A

2. PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON THIS MATERIAL, AND ON [REDACTED] EVALUATION OF IT, ESPECIALLY ON QUESTIONS C AND D.
3. PROVIDE A BRIEFING ON [REDACTED] PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING AND EVALUATION OF INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.

25X1A

4. PROVIDE OFFICE SPACE AND CLERICAL  
- SUPPORT.

C. EMBASSY SAIGON

PROVIDE BRIEFINGS ON ITS STATE OF  
WARNING OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND ON  
ITS RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS C AND D.

25X1A

D. [REDACTED]

1. PROVIDE ANY WARNING INFORMATION  
IT RECEIVED DURING 15-30 JANUARY.
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25X1A

*6. Team composition to follow  
separate msg.*  
DRAFTED BY: [REDACTED] CIA X7424

\* \* \*

PLEASE GIVE CONCURRENCES OR SUGGESTED CHANGES BY  
1200 FRIDAY AT THE LATEST. AFTER WORKING HOURS THE  
CIA SENIOR DUTY OFFICER, X 7551, CAN HANDLE.


RL

5

SECRET

M/G W.E. DePuy Joint Staff  
Fred Greene State/INR/REA

25X1A



11-5970.8  
DIA G-10/32  
DIA 57672  
DIA  
NSA

attended  
planning mtg 7 March